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Articles
Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of
Jurisdiction
Richard A. Epsteint
I. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK: THE LOGIC OF CONSENT
My assignment for this occasion asks me to apply my general
world view, which stresses, among other things, the importance
of voluntary exchange and strong property rights, to the vexed
problem of jurisdiction within our federal system. In undertaking
that task, I do not take the same critical view of the Supreme
Court's work that I have in other areas.' Indeed, on this topic, I
think that the set of rules now in place, in general, reaches the
right conclusion. I can easily see why many observed cases might
come out on the other side of some mythical line, but I do not see
a single conceptual move or trick that would lead to a major sim-
plification or improvement of the overall system.
Where I do differ from the received wisdom is as to the
grounds for defending the current system. The traditional analyst
explains jurisdiction in terms of sovereign power that a state ex-
erts over private individuals. In my view, the consent of the par-
ties to select this or that sovereign to resolve their dispute best
t James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The Law School at The
University of Chicago; Peter and Kristen Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution.
My thanks to Jack Goldsmith for his helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Robert
Alt, University of Chicago Law School Class of 2002, for his valuable research assistance.
1 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Do-
main (Harvard 1985); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va
L Rev 1387 (1987).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
explains the overall situation. Power of course has some role to
play, for without it, a court can enter no judgment at all. How-
ever, the question of whose power counts is what matters in ju-
risdictional issues, and on that question, states are in active com-
petition with each other to attract the business of litigants. In
that environment, the consent principle neatly explains the dy-
namics of many of our jurisdictional doctrines.
At the same time, however, a word of caution is appropriate.
Properly understood and applied, the idea of consent does not
supply a panacea for the law of jurisdiction any more than it does
in the law of contracts. All concepts are blurry at the edges, and it
seems instructive that the inevitable ambiguities in the law of
jurisdiction become most acute just where the traditional notions
of consent start to give way-that is, as we move from consensual
arrangements to disputes between strangers, especially with in-
ternational transactions. But difficulties at the margins are not
the same as decisive objections to the whole project, unless and
until the critic can come up with an alternative that performs
better across the full range of cases. In this context, no single le-
gal device, and no set of legal devices taken together, will solve
all problems so long as international business and occurrences do
not occur under the umbrella of a single sovereign. What is
needed, but not easily found, is a resolution of conflicts through
cooperation among states whose long-term interests align at best
only imperfectly with each other. In these cases, there will be a
clash of wills and a conscious effort to tilt the process in favor of
one's own nation. So in the international arena, we should expect
the worst, and often we will find it. But there is little that one can
do to remedy by way of legal reform because the political obsta-
cles loom so large. So I shall begin with the things that we can
control and then talk about those which we cannot. More con-
cretely, I start with general jurisdiction in contractual contexts
and move on from there to discuss both tort and criminal law.
To set the stage, I shall first summarize what I regard as the
appropriate mode of analysis. The problems of jurisdiction cannot
be analyzed in any sort of a vacuum but require the use of termi-
nology that is familiar throughout the law. Jurisdiction is thus
said to rest on multiple grounds: on consent, benefits conferred or
received, presence, activities within the jurisdiction, causal con-
nection between the conduct of the defendant to be charged and
the adverse consequences to a plaintiff who resides in or who was
hurt inside the forum state. All this terminological profusion is
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well enough and good because it reminds us that many of the
terms used to analyze disputes over jurisdiction are drawn from
the library of terms used to analyze substantive private law. That
conclusion is critical because it allows us to link up the study of
civil procedure with these substantive principles.
So let us then begin with some private law concepts. First, of
course, we have the idea of consent, which plays such a large role
in all discussions of individual obligations. The term consent is
inextricably linked to the idea of agreement and is, thus, impli-
cated by the proposition that persons who consent to certain obli-
gations are bound because they agree to be bound. The obligation
is regarded as legitimate because it is chosen from within, rather
than imposed from without. Parties who consent regard them-
selves as better off on net because they believe that what they
receive is worth more to them than what they surrender.
One possible burden that any party might undertake is to
risk suit in an inconvenient forum. However, that burden is, in
principle, no different from a binding promise to perform some
other onerous obligation unrelated to jurisdiction, where, again,
the inducement is the benefit obtained in exchange. The princi-
ples of exchange work the same in both jurisdictional and non-
jurisdictional contexts. The content or weight of the benefits and
burdens is not, save in extreme cases, a matter for the court to
consider. Certainly, it is wholly inappropriate for any court
within the context of the ordinary contractual obligation to split
the consideration on one side of the transaction so that it matches
the consideration, piece for piece, or dollar for dollar, that the
other party to the transaction supplied. The parties are charged
with that function, and our job, as a first approximation, is to de-
termine what the division of labor and responsibility is and, then,
to enforce those obligations just as they were crafted. The excep-
tions are likely to be more refined, and I shall address them pres-
ently. But, for these purposes, the ordinary rule of contract, as
was well stated by our late friend Thomas Hobbes, is that the
value of what is received in exchange depends upon the appetites
of the parties, not on someone's external validation of the worth
of what passes between the parties in the exchange.2
2 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 105 (Cambridge 1991) (R. Tuck, ed) ("As if it were
Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of
all things contracted for, is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the
just value, is that which they could be contented to give.").
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I think that the principle of freedom of contract and the
limitations on its use are the best tools to organize our
understanding of the problem of jurisdiction. In order to make out
that claim, I shall proceed in three stages. First, I shall deal in
Part II with the judicial reception of express contracts that
contain jurisdictional issues. Second, in Part III, I shall consider
the judicial use of principles of implied contracts to confront these
same issues. In Part IV, I shall turn to the use of hypothetical
contracts to deal with the intractable jurisdictional questions in
tort and criminal cases.
II. EXPRESS CONSENT BY CONTRACT
As an initial matter, I do not see any reason why the princi-
ple of voluntary exchange should not control when the contract in
question specifies the jurisdiction to which either or both parties
agree to repair in the event of a dispute. On this point, it is fortu-
nate that the United States Supreme Court generally accepts this
sensible attitude toward explicit consent on jurisdictional issues.
Exhibit A for this proposition is National Equipment Rental v
Szukhent,3 in which the question before the Court concerned the
service of process that was appropriate to bring a defendant,
resident of Michigan, who had defaulted on the payments for the
delivery under lease of farm equipment made in New York, gov-
erned by New York law.4 The original contract designated as the
defendant's agent within New York one Florence Weinberg (our
local hero),5 who happened to be the wife of one of the officers of
the plaintiff corporation.' Service was delivered to her and was
also sent registered mail to the defendants in Michigan so that
they were apprised of what they already knew: namely that they
had not paid one dime on the contract even though they had al-
ready taken delivery of the equipment.7 Justice Stewart held that
this arrangement for service of process, as part of the standard
contract, was binding on the plaintiff, notwithstanding the cozy
relationship between the plaintiff corporation and Mrs. Weinberg,
the defendant's designated agent.'
3 375 US 311 (1964).
4 Id at 312-13.
6 Id at 313.
6 Id at 319.
7 Szukhent, 375 US at 314.
8 Id at 314, 317-18.
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This business arrangement makes lots of commercial sense.
In cases like this, the real risk of loss falls on the seller who per-
forms first and not on the buyer who receives the benefits under
the contract before he pays for them. The relative economic size of
the parties tells little or nothing about their respective economic
positions in this dispute. What really matters is the sequence of
performance that, in this case, gave the practical advantage to
the Michigan defendant. It was to counter this advantage that
Mrs. Weinberg was appointed an agent for the limited purpose of
accepting service of process on the defendant. The system would
have been oppressive, perhaps, if the defendants had received no
notice and could not defend their rights. But, in this case at least,
that problem was obviated by the business arrangement that
called for that notice to be given.9 It is, therefore, a mistake to
treat Mrs. Weinberg as a customary agent, who has the right to
bind her principal by contract. The unmistakable intention of the
contractual system was not to have Mrs. Weinberg litigate the
case. Rather, it was to ensure that the litigation, when caused by
the defendant, had to take place on the plaintiff's turf and not the
defendant's. In some cases, this might not be appropriate; but in
most cases it will be. In most nonpayment cases the creditor
should win, and the rules on jurisdiction have to be fashioned in
light of overall probabilities and cannot be shifted magically to
aid the defendant-buyer only in those cases where he has credible
claim for fundamental breach of warranty. So, even if we cast an
independent gaze over the transaction, it looks to be an efficient
outcome, so long as we rid ourselves of the illusion that only firms
and never individuals, only sellers and never buyers, are tempted
to take illicit advantage of a contractual partner.
There is a sense, however, in which the solution reached in
Szukhent is inelegant, for much could be said against the invoca-
tion of its agency fiction to secure jurisdiction in the case. Overall,
procedural fictions are better eliminated by substantive rules
that say what they mean and mean what they say. My own de-
cided preference is for a rule that states that the parties by con-
tract may stipulate that New York is the relevant jurisdiction
and dispense with the extra formality of having service go both to
the defendant in Michigan and to the designated agent in New
York. The latter element is superfluous and possibly mischievous;
and the former is an essential part of the overall contractual de-
sign. As a business matter, the debtor needs the notice in order to
9 Id at 314.
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decide how to respond to the challenge. It is for that reason that
notice to the party in interest is critical to satisfy the constitu-
tional requirement of notice as outlined in Mullane v Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.10
This criticism of the use of fictions, however, is no stronger
(or weaker) than the criticism that one makes of any use of fiction
in any procedural context. The first question is whether the fic-
tion is one that facilitates the correct result or frustrates its at-
tainment. In this Case, the device used helps matters by getting
rid of any doubt about the service of process to the party in inter-
est under the Mullane doctrine. The second question is whether
the fiction in question is too costly or has some adverse collateral
consequences that impair its effectiveness. (A straw conveyance,
for example, is quite destructive if it results in the imposition of a
transfer tax, allows the interposition of third party liens or other
claims of title, complicates the title search, or introduces a quit
claim deed that may break the chain of warranty deeds.) But it
looks in this case as though the parties have seized on an inex-
pensive formality that removes any doubt as to the overall
soundness of the entire procedure. So the legal aesthetics are bad,
but the business practice itself turns out to be good. Once vali-
dated, it works with a minimum of fuss and bother as a routine
part of the standard transaction.
Yet there are objections to this rosy picture that should be at
least noted. Justice Black, in Szukhent, thought that it was odd
that the agent in question did not have any contact with the prin-
cipal;11 but he was wrong to voice jurisprudential angst about this
dangling agent. All depends on the purpose for which the agent is
selected contractually. Agency is an important contractual rela-
tionship that allows one person to act for the benefit of another.
However, the law is not in the thrall of an implicit set of Aristote-
lian essences that require a person, in order to fill the role of an
agent, either to assume full responsibility for a business or have
no role at all. The absence of discretion by contract design makes
intelligible the removal of the elements of personal touch and
trust that are found in typical working agency relationships.
Justice Black also argued that the agent was not an agent
"authorized by appointment," as the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
10 339 US 306 (1950) (finding a statute inadequate because it did not provide for
means to contact those who could easily be informed by other means or give enough time
for those interested to make an appearance).
11 Szukhent, 375 US at 319 (Black dissenting).
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dure use that phrase.12 But that proposition is also false, both
literally and as a matter of agency law, where the default provi-
sions on the scope of authority can be altered by any ordinary
expression of contrary consent. Justice Black then further
claimed that from Magna Charta forward ordinary citizens have
had a right to have any dispute litigated locally for their benefit. 3
But here comes the rub: local for defendant is distant for plaintiff,
and the question is whether the parties have any reason not to
pick ex ante the cost-minimizing joint jurisdiction. I cannot see
why we should place this ostensible interest in local litigation in
the legal pantheon, so long as price and other terms can vary to
offset the risk in question. The prospect here is not merely theo-
retical, because we can identify some real advantages to the
Szukhent arrangement. As noted above, the debtor has the initial
strategic advantage because the creditor has performed in full.
The enforcement of the claim in the creditor's court will materi-
ally lower, in my estimation, the probability of breach and, there-
fore, the need for either side to take legal action in the first place.
Also, the defendant-buyer was in willful breach of contract, where
the incentives for strategic behavior matter. Finally, the plaintiff-
seller is someone who has to do business with lots of people from
all quarters of the country. Having to learn and master one body
of law lowers his costs. The prospective buyer is not likely to
know Michigan's (or any other state's) law in advance, so he has
to learn up either way. The contractual arrangement adopted in
Szukhent thus promises lower total costs and greater parity be-
tween parties than the alternative position championed by Jus-
tice Black.
At root, the Black position seems to take a leaf from the con-
tract literature by branding this jurisdictional provision as part of
an illicit contract of adhesion, rather than as a bargain ham-
mered out between equals." If that is the case, then this and
every other arrangement that seeks to pre-set jurisdiction goes
down in flames unless it passes some case-by-case analysis of un-
conscionability. That prospect requires a detailed examination of
whether the terms in question were fully exposed to the buyer,
whether reasonable alternatives were offered, and whether the
terms were intrinsically fair. That approach is one that I have
12 Id at 320 (Black dissenting).
13 Id at 325 (Black dissenting).
14 See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of
Contract, 43 Colum L Rev 629, 633 (1943).
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long attacked for ordinary consumer practices.15 It could only be a
source of infinite mischief for jurisdictional issues because its er-
ratic application will defeat the great advantage of the Szukhent
rule: a high level of certainty that removes the basic jurisdic-
tional wrangle from the table. It is, therefore, most welcome that
the Supreme Court validated this jurisdictional oasis in the un-
conscionability desert just three years before the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit decided Williams v Walker Thomas Furniture Co,
16
which gave the unconscionability doctrine an undeserved en-
hanced respectability in consumer transactions.
The contrast between the substantive law and the jurisdic-
tional law seems clear even though the same arguments apply to
both cases. It is a mistake on either front to think that the doc-
trine of unconscionability has any role to play in competitive in-
dustries once it is clear that the party bound has received suffi-
cient notice of the relevant terms. For these purposes, it hardly
matters what independent decisions any rival firms make. If
these firms adopt the same term, then there is further confirma-
tion of the efficiency of the basic arrangement. If they offer a dif-
ferent arrangement, then the wary consumer can switch firms.
What matters is market structure, not some independent and
unmoored sense about the terms of contract that some disinter-
ested person might think appropriate for the occasion.
Szukhent is not the only case in which the Supreme Court
adopted a freedom of contract position (with minor qualifications
at the edges) in jurisdictional matters. Eight years later, in The
Bremen v Zapata Off-Shore Co,17 the Court approached the same
issue from the other side, and gave full force and effect, subject to
some minor qualifications, to a clause that required disputes to
be resolved in London under English law." The point makes good
sense and for the same structural reasons. So long as freedom of
contract is the norm, then the parties should have the same
power to remove a case from the jurisdiction as to bring it into
that jurisdiction.
Once again, the same logic about mutual advantage through
contract applies. The London courts could easily have expertise
that works for the benefit of both sides, as seems to be true in
15 For a general discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical
Reappraisal, 18 J L & Econ 293 (1975).
16 350 F2d 445 (DC Cir 1965), criticized in Epstein, 18 J L & Econ at 306-08 (cited in
note 15).
17 407 US 1 (1972).
18 Id at 2, 20.
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salvage cases, where they have extensive maritime experience. 9
Clearly, a regime which allows-indeed requires-the parties to
choose their jurisdiction after the fact will not work as well as one
which sets the jurisdiction in advance. Once the incident occurs,
each party will have gained some important knowledge of its own
prospects. It may well be that both sides will still favor the neu-
tral expertise of the London courts, but it could easily be the case
that one party will find that it would be better off to litigate in
some other forum, perhaps the courts of its own nation. The ex
ante approach means that the parties have chosen their forum
behind the veil of ignorance, and that, in turn, means that in the
broad run of cases, they have picked the right place to litigate.
For the few cases in which they have not, it is still possible for
them to negotiate after the fact a settlement that calls for arbi-
tration in some other forum.
As a matter of legal doctrine, one could regard The Bremen as
a sideshow on the ground that its jurisdictional provisions make
sense only because it was an agreement between commercial
equals. However, the last of the trifecta came with the decision of
that noted free-marketeer, Harry Blackmun, in the well-known
case of Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc v Shute.2" Justice Blackmun
took the position that the trial court should enforce a forum selec-
tion clause that designated the courts of Florida as the sole place
to litigate disputes between a cruise line and its passengers.2 In
that case, the injury took place while the defendant's ship was on
the high seas.22 The injured party was a resident of the state of
Washington,23 where she filed suit to recover tort damages.24 The
defendant had its principal place of business in Florida. 5 This
decision is surely notable insofar as this forum selection clause
was found in a consumer transaction and was related to the liti-
gation of tort claims-both topics on which the anticontractual
forces have made considerable headway in nonjurisdictional
cases.
Stripped to its essentials, Carnival Cruise Lines raises the
same question about the balance of inconvenience between the
19 See generally Wayne Brough, Liability Salvage-By Private Ordering, 19 J Legal
Stud 95 (1990).
20 499 US 585 (1991).
21 Id at 595.
22 Id at 588.
23 Id at 585.
24 Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 US at 588.
25 Id at 585.
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parties. In my view, the outcome of the case is so clearly correct
that it is hard to understand why it had to be litigated to the Su-
preme Court in the first place. The answer is the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine and the particular complications for these particular
plaintiffs. But if these individual explanations are allowed to tip
the balance, then the whole system starts to unravel. The costs to
the defendant are lower from uniform jurisdiction, and the costs
pass back through the system. The fact that all consumers get the
same deal offers an additional measure of protection. After all,
the most sophisticated consumers seem to be willing to accept
these provisions, so that it is not too much to hold that the less
informed consumers are doubly blessed: they get the same con-
tractual treatment (with its lower price component) without hav-
ing to incur the search costs that are borne by other consumers.
The fact that this is a consumer transaction, as opposed to a
commercial transaction between two firms, does not alter the pat-
tern of joint ex ante advantage. Thus, the law of jurisdiction
works reasonably well here because it rejects the idea that stan-
dard form contracts are not valid. If there is any concern here at
all, it should be with notice-whether the clause was conspicu-
ous-and that was not at stake. Nor should it have been: even
though the Court insists on notice as a bona fide requirement, it
should take pains to make it a simple matter for any standard
form contract to make the matter sufficiently conspicuous so that
the issue of surprise, on which the doctrine of unconscionability
originally turned, does not have to be litigated on a case-by-case
basis. I see no evidence in Carnival Cruise Lines that Justice
Blackmun paid lip-service to the basic decision to allow contrac-
tual selection of the forum only to take it all away by imposing a
notice requirement so stringent that no firm could hope to satisfy
it in the ordinary course of business.
The analysis is not quite yet complete. In dealing with forum-
selection clauses, a court might rightly be troubled if the clause
was inserted to evade some requirement of positive law that, in-
dependently of the selection provision, restricted freedom of con-
tract. After all, if regulation is valid on a matter of substance,
then its reach could perhaps extend to the procedures used to
support or evade the right in question. But that dark scenario
does not appear to have been the case here. The obvious reason
was for cost control and for uniform resolution of disputes. So
contract is king.
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Now the importance of this approach should be stressed re-
peatedly. Huge portions of the business of life arise out of a set of
contractual arrangements. Hence, the idea of express consent
holds out both a promise and a danger. The promise, which mat-
ters the most, is this: a clear and emphatic defense of freedom of
contract means that more and more cases will fall within the or-
bit of explicit consent provisions. The ostensible limitations in the
name of fundamental fairness are simple enough to obey. Pick
any jurisdiction with business ties to the potential defendant, and
which is generally accessible, and the game is over. However, at
the same time, the emphasis upon consent also gives rise to addi-
tional complications, some of which are easily resolvable and oth-
ers that are not.
III. IMPLIED CONSENT
The difficulties associated with the doctrine of consent in the
law of contract carry over to these jurisdictional issues. It is well
known that express consent is not the only form of consent avail-
able. Indeed, in principle, wherever there is express consent, the
possibility arises that the parties could have achieved that same
result by implied consent as a matter of fact. Yet determining
whether that implied consent has been given, and if so, what is
its proper scope, is never an easy task no matter what theory of
interpretation the courts adopt.
We have a legion of cases that ask which warranties or condi-
tions should be implied into which contracts.26 We know, at a
minimum, that these are high-risk inquiries. The justification for
undertaking them is that we think that there is enough regular-
ity in human events that we can do better than random in decid-
ing which warranties should be incorporated into some standard
or customary transaction and which should not. For example, we
take a very negative view about the implication of a warranty of
cure from the delivery of medical services, because we know that
the normal practices are otherwise and understand why that
should be the case: there are too many other variables apart from
the physician's services that can account for a negative outcome
26 For a discussion of the issues with implied conditions in the ordinary contract, see,
for example, E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 8(2) (Little, Brown 2d ed 1990). For an
early case of an implied condition, see Kingston v Preston, 2 Douglas 689, 99 Eng Rep 437
(KB 1773) (holding that giving a security was an implied condition for the transfer of
defendant's stock and business).
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in the particular case.27 Hence, we revert to a default rule of neg-
ligence because that standard ties liability more or less within
the control of the individual defendant. On the other hand, we
normally imply warranties that standard goods are reasonably fit
for the purpose that they were intended because we think that
modern manufacturers have the greater capacity to determine
what goes in, for example, their sealed containers.28
Yet even if the large number of cases is sensibly decided by
some standard presumptions, we are equally confident that the
selection of cases for litigation will result in having only the
hardest cases-a non-representative sample--come before us.29
For those, we have to look back to find the ostensible shared in-
tentions of the parties to see which way the risk of inconvenience
on matters of jurisdiction should be understood to have been allo-
cated. But intentions are elusive when unexpressed and often
unshared, and the question is what to do when we lack the in-
formation ordinarily imparted through explicit contracts. Here we
have a strong divergence of thought in the general contract litera-
ture, and that doubt necessarily carries over to the jurisdictional
question.
The first issue is this: how do we think about default terms in
the first place? Do we set the presumption against the stronger
party to the transaction (that is, that party that does the drafting
of the standard form) to force it to clarify the arrangement, or do
we try to find out what terms look, from the ex ante perspective,
to create the joint advantage of the parties in question?"°
My own view is to stick with the latter, more traditional, test.
The first of the reasons is scope: the effort to use default terms to
force one party to disclose information to the other does not apply
across the board to all kinds of terms or to all sorts of settings.
There are some cases where one party may have special informa-
tion or bargaining advantage. There are also many transactions
27 See, for example, Sullivan v O'Connor, 296 NE2d 183, 186 (1973) (noting that be-
cause of the "uncertainties of medical science and the variations in the physical and psy-
chological conditions of individual patients, doctors can seldom in good faith promise spe-
cific results").
28 See, for example, UCC § 2-314 (ALI 1962) ("Goods to be merchantable must be at
least such as... are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require.").
29 See generally George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984) (asserting that relatively harder cases will be more
likely to be subject to litigation).
30 See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling the Gaps of Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87 (1989) (considering when parties should
not be allowed to contract around default rules).
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in which neither party has a dominant hand, and both sides just
want to resort to routine gap-fillers to take care of material that
it is too costly to draft explicitly if some serviceable alternatives
are available. What might work as a strategy in dealing with con-
tracts between certain customers and their carriers, for example,
is not likely to work in simple partnerships or employment con-
tracts.
The advantage of the mimicry approach is its universal ap-
plication. In contrast, default-forcing rules apply only to a limited
class of situations. This point gains salience when one notes that
it is not sufficient to the use of the default-forcing approach to
have a perceived dominant party. Market structure also matters.
Term-forcing does not seem to be a relevant situation in competi-
tive markets with low transaction costs, because the parties face
a unique equilibrium situation that renders any discrete bargain-
ing unnecessary. It therefore becomes necessary to draw infer-
ences not only about the kinds of parties but also about the kinds
and shapes of markets-a costly and error-prone inquiry.
A powerful selection effect fortifies this conclusion: no default
rule will satisfy the general counsels of any corporation that en-
gages in a large volume of transactions. They are fanatic about
drafting their own provisions, especially in connection with such
critical matters as limiting liability for consequential damages.
Large firms cannot tolerate any legal vagaries on the effective-
ness of their positions as they move from one state to another.
They will not use an incomplete contract that can be fleshed out
in different ways in different cases. They strive for uniform provi-
sions to ensure (perceived) equity between customers and low
internal administrative costs for a legal staff that has to resolve
countless routine disputes long before they edge toward litigation.
Such lawyers are not going to rely on any default provision. They
will draft exactly what they want (often with firm-specific terms
dealing with such matters as the location for lodging complaints,
for example).
That strong selection bias should influence our attitude to-
ward default provisions, for we can assume that the default pro-
visions are likely to be called into play exactly in those cases
where neither party has the sophistication or inclination to draft
expressly. For those parties, the effort to mimic the dominant-
that is, the most common solution-makes the most sense. We
should therefore stick to the traditional approach, which can eas-
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ily make a difference in decided cases, since so many disputes
involve large firms that do business with isolated customers.
So the question, then, is how the implied consent approach,
for all its mushiness, plays out against the decided cases. The
first of those that I would look to is the now discredited decision
of Pennoyer v Neff." Mitchell, an Oregon lawyer, sued Neff in
Oregon for three hundred dollars owing for legal services that
Mitchell rendered to Neff when the latter still lived in Oregon.
Neff had moved to California prior to the onset of the suit: notice
of the suit was published in Oregon. It was not clear that Mitchell
knew of Neff's whereabouts to give him actual notice in Califor-
nia. After a default judgment was entered against Neff, Mitchell
purchased Neff's property from a foreclosure sale for little more
than the unpaid debt and thereafter sold it to Pennoyer for a
price closer to its market value of fifteen thousand dollars.2 Neff
sued Pennoyer in federal court in Oregon to recover the land,
claiming that the initial sheriff's sale to Mitchell was invalid. The
Pennoyer Court held that jurisdiction failed because service of
process ran only within the state, and notice (even personal no-
tice) to a party located outside the state did not make up that de-
ficiency:3 Oregon and California were separate, self-contained
islands within the federal system. In Justice Field's words:
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by
the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.
Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits
would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by
this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be re-
sisted as mere abuse.34
In line with the central theme of this essay, Justice Field
seems to be wrong as a matter of principle, by focusing too much
on power and too little on consent. The first danger sign is his use
of the phrase "necessarily restricted."35 Few things in this world
meet that exacting standard for judgment. In this case, moreover,
the phrase seems to be badly misdirected. The power of the court
31 95 US 714 (1877).
32 Note that on the facts Neff might be able to set aside the foreclosure sale because of
the manifest inadequacy of the price, an issue that has nothing to do with jurisdiction as
such. See, for example, Murphy v Financial Development Corp, 495 A2d 1245, 1250 (NH
1985).
33 Pennoyer, 95 US at 734.
34 Id at 720.
35 Id.
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to enforce its own judgments is confined to its own territory. The
moment it wishes to assert its authority in some other territory,
it has to contend with the courts and legal officials of that juris-
diction. However, it hardly follows that the court can only exer-
cise its power over people who are in, or property that is located
in, its own jurisdiction. In Pennoyer, the state statute contem-
plated service by publication of summons to individuals who are
outside the state. 6 That notice cannot bind them to come, but it
does give them notice (in the same sense that turned out to be so
critical in Szukhent) of the proceedings against them. Once in-
formed, then the defendants can decide whether to defend them-
selves within the forum or run the risk of a default judgment.
Then once judgment is entered against defendants with notice, it
should be possible to proceed in the ordinary matter, both to seize
property within the state, or to sue on the judgment elsewhere if
that proves necessary. Notwithstanding the occasional procedural
pitfall, it is easy to devise procedures to overcome the absence of
a defendant so long as it is sensible to hale him into court in the
first place.
But why is it legitimate to do so? Suppose that the contract
for services at issue in Pennoyer had been negotiated and exe-
cuted in California and that it was Mitchell (the plaintiff-creditor)
who moved thereafter to Oregon. In these circumstances, I would
be loathe to apply the Oregon statute in ways that force Neff (the
defendant), even with personal notice, to litigate in a state to
which Mitchell had moved unilaterally after the dispute. That
notice does not seem sufficient to drag a party into a state with
which he has absolutely no connections at all. How then do we
explain the difference between these two scenarios? The simplest
approach seems to be to ask what terms the parties would have
agreed to if they had explicitly negotiated on the question of ju-
risdiction at the time they entered into their contract. Here, the
uniform answer in both the real case and my additional hypo-
thetical is this: jurisdiction to resolve the dispute exists in the
state where both parties resided when they entered into the con-
tract. From the ex ante perspective, this means that neither
party can bring the suit in an alien forum even if he obtains
physical presence over the other party there. The decision thus
curtails the prospect of strategic behavior by both parties and
gives a clear and simple rule.
36 Id at 718.
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The issue here is not that of sovereignty in the sense of power
to decree'rules. Rather, there is a competition between sovereigns
to see which one offers services that most fit the needs of the par-
ties. The express contract cases give a clear answer even when
one party is out of state. It is hard to imagine that any express
contract would pick an arbitrary state to which neither party has
connections when it can pick a state to which both parties have
strong connections. It seems easy to mimic the terms of the ideal
express contract in this situation: and that mimicry calls for Ore-
gon, when the contract is formed in Oregon by both present there,
and California, when (as in my hypothetical) both parties are
present there. It is odd to believe that the litigation must come to
California solely because Neff decides to leave Oregon. At the
time of the contract the only state in which it made sense to regu-
late the transaction (sense enough for this to be binding pre-
sumptively) was the state in which all the relevant actions took
place.
Pennoyer, moreover, does not offer any intelligible
stronger/weaker party situation for which the default-forcing ra-
tionale is even intelligible. But using an implied consent that
mimics the actual consent leads in this case to an outcome so
clear that the problem is not worth a second thought. It is only
because Justice Field placed the false emphasis on judicial power
that the point was missed. In reality, this case is no different
from the Szukhent case discussed earlier. 7 The point of notice to
the defendant is to let him return to the jurisdiction to defend
himself. Because there was no planning in advance, we no longer
have the functional equivalent of Mrs. Weinberg to make the fic-
tions work. That being the case, we should just do without that
prop altogether. Adequate notice, along the lines of the decision
in Mullane v Central Hanover Bank," should suffice; and here,
that standard means personal notice if possible, since this is a
personal action against only a single defendant.
In my view, the strength of the implied consent conception,
not its weakness, accounts for what is wrong with Pennoyer. By
this view, the rule that International Shoe Co v Washington39
37 See text accompanying notes 3-9.
38 339 US 306, 314 (1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due proc-
ess in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, un-
der the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.").
39 326 US 310, 316 (1945) (holding that "due process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
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represents is, as a matter of first principle, a welcome, if imper-
fect, correction of the earlier decision. International Shoe involved
the question of whether the state of Washington could assert ju-
risdiction in Washington to collect local taxes owed with respect
to sales activities that International Shoe had undertaken within
the state.40 Here, Washington made no effort to lever its jurisdic-
tion to cover all activities of the company.41 Indeed, that approach
was, if anything, disclaimed by Chief Justice Stone, who limited
this decision to transactions that occurred within Washington
state.42 So think of this as a contract question: whether the state
should be so prejudiced on jurisdictional matters that it cannot
replicate ex post the position of lenders, cruise lines and other
commercial parties. The party that comes to the state to sell can
be asked to remain to pay the taxes on those sales. The state
doubtless has lots of entrants from lots of different places, and
the rationales that point to the home state as the proper forum in
the contract cases carries over here without missing a beat. Liti-
gation of Washington transactions in Washington courts follows
the revised Pennoyer line perfectly. On this analysis, the famous
phrases of "minimum contacts" and "fair play" and "substantial
justice"43 are, I think, the source of some real mischief because
they tend to make this assertion of jurisdiction look more adven-
turous than it really is in light the applicable private analogies.
But there is one potentially discordant note in this context,
which is that the state has a monopoly over the power of taxation.
A sound unconstitutional conditions analysis therefore-one that
rejects the proposition that the greater power always includes the
lesser-suggests that there is some limitation on the power of the
state to exact conditions from firms that do business within its
boundaries.44 That doctrine always places at least some limits on
the conditions that it can exert for consent. But here we do not
have a situation where Washington says that if you want to sell
in this state, then you have to agree to answer any and all suits
within this jurisdiction regardless of where they arise. Interna-
the forum, he have certain contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice').
40 Id at 311.
41 See id at 314.
42 Id at 321 ("activities which establish its 'presence' subject it alike to taxation by the
state and to suit to recover the tax").
43 International Shoe, 326 US at 316.
44 For my more extended treatment of these issues, see Richard A. Epstein, Bargain-
ing with the State 167 (Princeton 1993) (examining unconstitutional conditions cases).
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tional Shoe is not a case like either Hammer v Dagenhart45 or the
Child Labor Tax Case" in which the leverage element associated
with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions applies in any
real sense of the term. We do not have a case where in order to do
business in Washington state, a party is asked to concede juris-
diction over all its transactions worldwide. Rather, the well-
behaved monopolist is doing just what was required of him,
which is to impose conditions that are no more onerous than
those demanded by parties who operate in competitive industries
without the benefit of the distinctive sovereign power enjoyed by
the state. International Shoe thus looks more like the decision of
the Supreme Court in Hess v Pawloski," which upheld the idea
that simply driving within the state amounts to consent to its
jurisdiction for disputes arising out of highway accidents within
the state.48 That decision would be rather different if mere driving
within the state were grounds for comprehensive personal juris-
diction over unrelated contract or family disputes.
There is one further way to see the sense in this approach for
both state taxation and local highway accidents. As a matter of
theory, it is hard to credit any implied consent approach that al-
lows one party to be subject to suit in countless jurisdictions for
wrongs that occur anywhere in the world. But so long as we rec-
ognize that the state assertion of power only applies to transac-
tions within the state, then we can place this worry easily to one
side. These decisions easily generalize in the sense that all other
states in which International Shoe does business could require it
to answer locally for their sales taxes. Even if all states take ad-
vantage of that rule, the company could not claim that it was op-
pressed by multiple inconsistent commands that it could not re-
spond to simultaneously. The same is true with Hess in the torts
context. The decisions again seem easy on the implied consent
view.
The question, then, is how far can we push this implied con-
sent logic. One of the early cases after International Shoe that
illustrates this problem is McGee v International Life Insurance
Co,49 which upheld the ability to assert jurisdiction based on the
45 247 US 251 (1918) (holding that Congress could not prohibit the shipment, in inter-
state commerce, of goods made by young children).
46 259 US 20 (1922) (holding that Congress lacked power to specially tax employers
who employed child labor).
47 274 US 352 (1927).
48 Id at 356-57.
49 355 US 220 (1957).
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solicitation and service of a single life insurance contract within
the forum state, to wit: that of the insured. 0 Here we see that the
standard analysis that helped explain the Szukhent case makes
clear that the insurance company would insist, like lenders and
shipowners and state taxing authorities, that the disputes be re-
solved in the courts of its home state. All the arguments about
convenience and uniformity should point in that direction. But it
comes out the other way because, in dealing with International
Shoe, we find that there is a sufficient contact with the state to
justify the use of its own jurisdiction for this one transaction. It
looks as though McGee adopts the view that default terms should
be forced to spur power parties into action, which is not the test
that I would use for the reasons set out above. By the same token,
I expect that it is easy for every insurance company to take up
the invitation that was proffered them in McGee. I assume that
they could, if they so chose, include a forum selection clause in
their agreements, which would make their home state the sole
forum for adjudicating claims. If so, then we see an important
feature of doing business in a regime that respects freedom of
contract: explicit provisions in future transactions can easily cor-
rect any error judicial rule made in forum selection.
This implied consent rationale also helps explain Hanson v
Denckla,5" decided the next year. There the Court refused to find
that a bank that controlled trust funds in Delaware could be
haled down to Florida by a disappointed beneficiary when a
power of appointment under a will was exercised in Florida.52
This seems correct. This is a case where the minimum contacts
language and the implied consent theory cut in the same direc-
tion. The key point with respect to both is that the holder of the
power could move anywhere he chose without consultation with,
and certainly without the approval of, the bank. So, the issue is
why the strategic behavior of C, the holder of the power, should
confer jurisdiction on a state for a dispute that involves A, the
trustee, and B, the beneficiary. It seems that this bank has all
the same interests that we found in the other cases, but with this
one variation. There was no discrete transaction with the holder
of the power after the creation of the trust. But, by the same to-
ken, this is all of minimal importance in the grand scheme of
things. A well-executed trust agreement would make the home
50 Id at 223.
51 357 US 235 (1958).
52 Id at 251-53.
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state of the bank the place for litigation over all issues arising out
of it. The key point is that the express contracts can handle all
these cases, so we should expect, with time, the domain of implied
contracts cases to shrink.
This approach might also work to cover other cases that have
generally provoked some uneasiness. Take for example the ques-
tion found in Shaffer v Heitner,53 where the plaintiff shareholders
in a Delaware corporation sought unsuccessfully to leverage that
interest to make Delaware the forum for a derivative suit against
the directors of that corporation, which had its headquarters in
Phoenix, for activities that occurred in Oregon.54 The question
was whether quasi in rem jurisdiction could survive in Delaware
where the property in question, the directors' stock, was not a
subject of the suit.55 It is a peculiarity of Delaware law that it re-
gards all stock issued in a Delaware corporation as being located
in Delaware wholly without regard to the location of the parties
to the transaction or of the share certificate. 6 As a general mat-
ter, quasi in rem jurisdiction gives the state jurisdiction over any
dispute whatsoever, so long as the recovery is limited to the value
of the property situated within the state.57 Under that view,
Delaware could assert jurisdiction over the defendants so long as
they were the owners of any stock in any Delaware corporation,
even stock in corporations wholly unrelated to the lawsuit in
question.
In dealing with this contention, it is first useful to ask
whether Delaware should have jurisdiction solely by ownership of
any stock of a Delaware corporation-that is, one whose own in-
ternal affairs the lawsuit did not bring into question. As a matter
of the theory of implied consent, it is difficult to envision any
weaker claim for jurisdiction than this. What possible efficiency
gains are there to allowing Delaware to adjudicate a derivative
suit against the directors of a corporation whose activities oc-
curred far outside the state's borders? Ex ante it is no more likely
that either side would prefer this forum to one in Montana or
Hawaii. It seems as though quasi in rem jurisdiction should flunk
53 433 US 186 (1977).
54 Id at 189-91.
55 Id at 189.
56 See 8 Del Code Ann § 169 (1991) ("For all purposes of title, action, attachment,
garnishment and jurisdiction of all courts held in this State, but not for the purposes of
taxation, the situs of ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the
laws of this State, whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as
in this State.").
57 Shaffer, 433 US at 199.
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the implied consent test as a general matter. It hardly follows
from this, however, that in denying Delaware's jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court rightly decided Shaffer on its facts, for here juris-
diction might sensibly rest on the fact that this derivative suit
pertained to the affairs of a Delaware corporation. The parties
that choose to avail themselves of Delaware law to form their
corporation cannot be said as a matter of course to have ruled out
the possibility that Delaware could supply a forum to resolve
their disputes.
But just how might this problem be resolved? One approach
is, of course, to look solely at the parties to the dispute and to ig-
nore the corporate overlay. If that is done, then the location of all
relevant events outside of Delaware suggest that it is not a good
place to litigate this case and that the right place to litigate the
case would have been where the defendants had conducted their
business. But suppose, now, that Delaware had enacted a statute
that said that it reserved the right to offer a forum to resolve all
disputes that arise out of the internal affairs of a Delaware corpo-
ration. At this point, we have to ask whether we face the usual
unconstitutional conditions question lurking behind such cases as
International Shoe or Hess v Pawolski. It does not appear that we
do. There is vigorous competition among states for corporate
charters, and, if Delaware imposes this condition as a matter of
public law, then the parties are free to take their business else-
where. Ironically, though, the reason why Delaware attracts so
much business is that it generally takes the position that all its
corporate code provisions are default terms that the parties can
contract out of at will. 8 If so, then there should be no problem at
all with Delaware's position, and this raises the interesting ques-
tion of whether, and if so, how, a corporate charter would include
a forum selection clause among its many provisions. 9 Neverthe-
58 For example, Delaware's business combination statute is not mandatory, but rather
has an opt-out provision. See 8 Del Code Ann § 203 (1991).
59 6 Del Code Ann § 2708 (1999) governs Delaware choice-of-law clauses. Sections (a)
and (b) of the statute allow any action relating to an agreement which contains a Dela-
ware choice-of-law clause to be maintained in Delaware. The sections provide:
(a) The parties to any contract, agreement or other undertaking, contin-
gent or otherwise, may agree in writing that the contract, agreement
or other undertaking shall be governed by or construed under the
laws of this State, without regard to principles of conflict of laws, or
that the laws of this State shall govern, in whole or in part any or all
of their rights, remedies, liabilities, powers and duties if the parties,
either as provided by law or in the manner specified in such writing
are, (i) subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in,
Delaware and, (ii) may be served with legal process. The foregoing
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less, all these refinements do not eliminate the basic point that
quasi in rem jurisdiction is always inappropriate if the only
ground for its assertion is that the defendant owns some prop-
erty, whether shares or real estate, within the state that wishes
to assert its jurisdiction. It makes no sense at all to say that I, as
an Illinois resident involved in an Illinois contract dispute, could
be sued in Texas if I happened to own (as I do not) a ranch there.
To that extent, at least, the attack on quasi in rem jurisdiction in
Shaffer makes eminently good sense.
This logic also explains why Shaffer was correct to hold that
the situs of property is a proper forum to exercise in rem jurisdic-
tion, that is, jurisdiction over disputes concerning real estate lo-
cated within its territory."s As a matter of first principle, we are
looking at default rules. Presumably, two parties to a mortgage
on land secured in California could seek to resolve the title dis-
putes in Michigan. But cui bono? Sooner or later, the winning
party will have to return to California to make its successful
judgment part of the record title; and most, if not all, the evidence
on that title is likely to be found in California. The costs of litiga-
tion are reduced, without introducing any ex ante tilt in the out-
come, by keeping litigation there, so that it is utterly unheard of
for anyone to initiate suit to quiet title outside the jurisdiction
that contains the land. It is easy to attribute this to an applica-
tion of the power theory, for in a sense it is: the only sovereign
who can protect the property is the one where it is located. The
consent theory leads to exactly the same conclusion, for it is in
the interest of neither side to go elsewhere. The rule is wholly
invariant in practice because no one wants to migrate anywhere
else.
For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that any
dispute over the title to real property is radically different from
the quasi in rem theory junked in Shaffer. So, again, the in rem
shall conclusively be presumed to be a significant, material and rea-
sonable relationship with this State and shall be enforced whether or
not there are other relationships with this State.
(b) Any person may maintain an action in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion in this State where the action or proceeding arises out of or re-
lates to any contract, agreement or other undertaking for which a
choice of Delaware law has been made in whole or in part and which
contains the provision permitted by subsection (a) of this section.
For a full explanation and discussion of the Delaware choice-of-law statute, consider Larry
E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 Del J Corp L 999
(1994).
60 Shaffer, 433 US at 207-08.
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arguments make good sense from the implied consent theory. The
results are so strong that, even as a matter of hypothetical con-
sent, we should always treat the situs as a focal point in those
cases where the disputes are between total strangers as well as
between parties to an explicit transaction, for example, a lease or
a mortgage, who will make the situs of the property the forum for
the resolution of the dispute. If so, then in rem jurisdiction should
be treated presumptively like the forum-selection clause found in
Carnival Cruise Lines.61 The jurisdiction where the property lies
is the sole place to go as a default matter, unless otherwise
agreed. Since that never happens, the rule takes on a strong per
se character.
Burnham v Superior Court of California62 offers yet another
variation on the same basic theme. Here the marriage in question
broke up in New Jersey, and the husband had agreed that he
would allow the wife to file for divorce in New Jersey on grounds
of "irreconcilable differences."63 Then, however, she moved to
California, and he chose to sue for "desertion" in New Jersey but
did not file.64 I have little doubt that New Jersey was the right
place to resolve this divorce and that the wife's moving away did
not confer jurisdiction on California any more than the migration
of the holder of the power of appointment gave jurisdiction to the
Florida courts in Hanson v Denckla.6" In the case, however, he
came to visit his children in California, and she sued him there.66
Justice Scalia then invoked the hoary rule that a party always
has jurisdiction over anyone whom he catches within the jurisdic-
tion.67 The traditional rule, he concluded, was not altered by the
Court's decision in Shaffer, which only governs those cases in
which the defendant was not present in the state, and for which
minimum contacts (or implied consent) is used to determine the
appropriate jurisdiction.68
Justice Brennan's concurrence argued that presence within
the jurisdiction should only create a presumption of jurisdiction,
such that the quality of the contacts, including the brevity of the
stay, should really matter.69 His last point invites disaster, be-
61 See text accompanying notes 20-21.
62 495 US 604 (1990).
63 Id at 607.
64 Id.
65 See text accompanying notes 51-52.
66 Burnham, 495 US at 608.
67 Id at 610-16.
68 Id at 621.
69 Id at 629 (Brennan concurring).
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cause jurisdiction is a mass-production business that courts
should never resolve by ad hoc exceptions to general rules that
require trials of their own. It hardly follows, however, that this
case belonged in California without mutual consent, given that
the dispute between the parties arose in New Jersey, where they
were then domiciled. Since this dispute arose out of a consensual
arrangement, the proper implied term is one that confers exclu-
sive jurisdiction on New Jersey. Presence is never the test in con-
sensual cases: consent is. That ground of decision, moreover,
leaves the state its usual power to settle disputes between
strangers that arose within its jurisdiction. But that principle
should not, in my view, be so construed to imply that, if the plain-
tiff can catch the defendant in an airplane over Arkansas, juris-
diction is proper in Arkansas." But, in most cases, that rule will
not lead to any miscarriages of justice, because forum non con-
veniens will supply a standard corrective to this grotesque asser-
tion of jurisdiction. Ironically, that line was not available in an
obvious fashion in Burnham, given the plaintiff's newly estab-
lished residence in California.
Yet matters are not always so straightforward because often-
times we do not have privity between the parties. We have to de-
cide, therefore, what the implicit agreement would be as between
the parties whose own understandings of the matter are murky
at best. One key line of cases deriving from International Shoe
asks what kinds of contacts within a given state allow it to assert
jurisdiction not only over the particular transaction, but also over
any suit brought against the defendant. Surely some state has to
have that power over a given transaction, unless the implied term
of a business contract is that one party agrees never to sue its
opposite number at all. Since at least one state can exercise juris-
diction, the location of the defendant's home office is as good as
any for the residual jurisdiction, absent any contractual provision
to the contrary. It hardly follows, however, that there should only
be one such place. The problem here is much more difficult than
those we have faced before, because, once we are talking about
general jurisdiction, then we are talking about potential tort
suits, and these will not usually be governed by explicit or even
implicit contracts that select the jurisdiction. So the question of
implication necessarily becomes much harder, and we cannot in-
70 But see Grace v MacArthur, 170 F Supp 442, 443, 447-48 (E D Ark 1959) (defen-
dant served in airplane flying over Arkansas; service held sufficient to establish jurisdic-
tion).
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voke a norm of transactional efficiency, because there is no bar-
gain to which it can be appended.
So how then do we proceed? In Perkins v Benguet Consoli-
dated Mining Co,71 the president and the general manager of a
Philippine mining corporation ran their business out of Ohio dur-
ing the Second World War.72 It was clear that the Japanese
occupation prevented the conduct of their business as usual
inside the Philippines; so the Ohio operation covered the full
range of actions that the corporation undertook.73 It seems to me
to be the ideal situation for the assertion of general jurisdiction in
Ohio. This conclusion is supported by reasons more powerful than
the "continuous and systematic" connections with the area, at
least as that term was construed in International Shoe.74 Rather,
in Perkins, the contacts were more extensive, given that the
defendant had transferred the operation of its business to Ohio.
I also think that the Court came out the right way in Helicop-
teros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v Hall.75 The defendant, known
as "Helicol," was a Colombian corporation engaged in supplying
helicopter transfer services in South America.76 One of its helicop-
ters crashed in Peru, taking the lives of four United States citi-
zens, who were employed by a Peruvian consortium, Consorcio,
working in Peru.77 Consorcio was the "alter ego" of a joint ven-
ture, William-Sedco-Horn, that operated out of Houston.78 The
plaintiffs sued in Houston79 and claimed that the appropriate con-
tacts existed there by a showing that Helicol's president had
flown to Houston to negotiate the terms of the contract for trans-
71 342 US 437 (1952).
72 Id at 437.
73 Id at 447-48. In Clermont County, Ohio, the president of the company "maintained
an office in which he conducted his personal affairs and did many things on behalf of the
company." There, he kept:
office files of the company ... carried on there correspondence relating to
the business of the company and to its employees ... drew and distrib-
uted ... salary checks on behalf of the company ... used and maintained
... two active bank accounts carrying substantial balances of company
funds. A bahk in Hamilton County, Ohio, acted as transfer agent for the
stock of the company. Several directors' meetings were held at his office
or home in Clermont County. From that office he supervised policies ....
74 International Shoe, 326 US at 317 (attempting to define "continuous and system-
atic" presence within the forum).
75 466 US 408 (1984).
76 Id at 409.
77 Id at 409-10.
78 Id at 410.
79 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 US at 412.
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port in Peru.8" That contract further provided that "controversies
arising out of the contract would be submitted to the jurisdiction
of the Peruvian courts."8 Both before and after the contract was
signed, Helicol purchased some of its equipment in Texas and
sent some of its maintenance personnel to Texas for further train-
ing. 2 However, Helicol had never been authorized to do business
in Texas, and it owned no property in the state.83
The Supreme Court, reversing the decision below, held that
these facts were not sufficient to create jurisdiction in Texas,
even under the Perkins standards. 4 The Court's decision seems
correct, but it is important to understand how the argument
should have proceeded. The first question that the Court should
have asked is whether the contract that allocated these disputes
to the Peruvian courts was binding on the individual decedents,
who do not appear to have been signatories to it. The normal
principle, of course, is that individuals are not bound to contracts
to which they are not parties. But it remains an open question
whether individual employees in their contracts with Consorcio
had agreed to accept jurisdiction in Peru as part of their deal. If
so, then Helicol could be regarded as a third-party beneficiary of
that agreement, entitled to block an assertion of jurisdiction in
the United States. Here the exact pattern of this transaction is
not that critical. What is important is that a clear decision be
made to allow networks of contracts to determine jurisdiction in
disputes between parties who are not in privity with each other.
That could easily be done by first having Consorcio bargain with
its workers, and then having it enter into contracts consistent
with those outcomes with Helicol. Or Consorcio could run the se-
quential negotiation in the opposite direction. At this point, the
linkage among the three parties should lead to a consistent set of
express contracts that solve the problem in line with the first sec-
tion of this paper.
The actual decision in Helicopteros does not, however, pursue
this line but, rather, asks the different question of whether the
activities that Helicol undertook in Texas were sufficient to sub-
ject it to jurisdiction there under the Texas long-arm statute. The
Court's negative conclusion on that issue seems to be clearly cor-
rect within the traditional framework. Certainly, there is not the
80 Id at 416.
81 Id at 411.
82 Id.
83 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 US at 411.
84 Id at 415-16.
[2001:
CONSENT-BASED JURISDICTION
slightest indication that Helicol set up a business-in-exile such as
that found in Perkins. The only thing that could be done to secure
jurisdiction is to act as though the set of isolated contacts sufficed
to shift the center of gravity to Texas when it seemed so clearly to
be lodged in Peru. To put the point in its simplest form, Helicol
doubtless made a number of independent forays into the United
States in order to pursue clients, order equipment, train staff,
and the like. If the Supreme Court had found that jurisdiction
attached in Texas, then chances are that twenty other states
could have exercised jurisdiction over the defendant because of its
local activities unrelated to the accident. Something is amiss
here, and the explanation seems clear enough. If (and there is
some uncertainty here) the actual contracts signed did not bind
the employees of Consorcio, then we have to shift from express to
implied consent in order to unravel the jurisdictional elements of
this case. In light of the full range of circumstances regarding the
location of the decedents' work, the actual contracts with their
employer, and the place of the accident, Peru has it over Texas in
a landside. There can be no doubt that a string of contracts (with
appropriate price adjustments) could have resulted in Helicol
agreeing to litigate Peruvian accidents in a Texas court. Short of
that, however, the Helicopteros decision should stand.
It is one thing to have developed a consistent methodology for
dealing with jurisdictional cases and quite another to assume
that it yields consistent results across the board. At this point,
therefore, we have to confess that the only methodology that we
possess starts to exhaust its power, and we should seek other
ways to look at the problem. In saying all this, we admit to a very
high level of error, which is consistent with the observed differ-
ences in the cases. However, here is one argument in favor of the
retention of jurisdiction, generally. Obviously, the plaintiff who
chooses to sue in a particular location is content with that choice.
The question, then, is whether there is an equal or larger incon-
venience from the point of view of the defendant that offsets this
advantage and could support the implication that if these
particular parties had been able to contract in advance, they
would have excluded this jurisdiction. Well, you could not make
that point about the principal place of business of a defendant, for
if that is not a place where it can be sued, then where else is the
place for residual claims that do not have a clear home some-
where else? Then, the argument is whether the availability of
that one fixed forum means that we do not have to worry about
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the creation of a second, because the defendant has expressed a
desire that all residual claims go to one place. But that does not
seem to be decisive, for if the defendant sets up shop somewhere
else and conducts his business in an ordinary fashion there, then
he has already signaled some willingness to be sued on a broad
range of transactions that relate to this jurisdiction. As a result,
the marginal cost of picking this forum is, to the defendant, lower
than might otherwise might appear to be the case given the prior
preferences as to as to its selection. The broader the range of po-
tential outcomes we have in these matters, the easier it is to infer
that this cost is sufficiently low that we should allow jurisdiction.
Now the question is how to apply this insight. Here we have
to realize that whenever we talk about the marginal costs and
benefits of certain arrangements, we are forced to adopt some
decision procedure that says that two points that are arbitrarily
close may nonetheless lie on opposite sides of the line. That is the
consequence of the geometric truth that it is always possible to
cut a line between any two points, however close they appear to
be. That sharp discontinuity is, for example, a routine feature of
the law of negligence. Although it causes much discomfort, we do
not abandon a negligence system simply because we know that
the lines cross somewhere when costs rise and benefits decline. It
should not force us to abandon the test in this case given the
same constraint applies. So the most that we can ask is that we
look for cases that arrange the array of relevant facts in a fashion
that speaks to the right ordering along the line, knowing full well
that we cannot get perfect agreement on the location of that cut-
off point. Juries are expected to disagree on how fast is too fast,
or how slippery is too slippery. The key task is to array the cases
in the right order along the continuum. It would be odd, for ex-
ample, to reverse the outcomes in Perkins and Helicopteros. That
said, so long as liability turns on questions of degree, then we
have to accept the risk of honest disagreement. And we do.
IV. HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT
The discussion in the last section has already touched on the
risks of hypothetical consent in organizing the legal doctrine on
jurisdiction. Here, as always, it is important to begin with the
easy cases, if only to establish that the consent doctrine has at
least some traction in this most inhospitable terrain.
Thus, as noted earlier, contract cannot solve title disputes
over a single tract of land between two strangers, since the par-
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ties have established, by definition, no relations, express or im-
plied, between themselves. Nonetheless, we know enough about
the basic dynamics of title disputes to say that if the parties had
contracted on this particular question, then in all probability they
would have chosen the situs of the property as the place to re-
solve their dispute. That forum gives, as a first approximation, no
advantage to either party; it permits the resolution of the issue to
take place in a jurisdiction that can easily make its disposition
part of its official title records; and it tracks the jurisdictional
rule used by persons (mortgagor and mortgagee) who are in priv-
ity with each other.
Likewise, we can use the same argument to explain why any
tort (whether or not on the highway) between two individuals
should normally be adjudicated in the place of its occurrence. We
all move in and out of states all the time. Chosen behind the veil
of ignorance, this rule generally assures that at least one person
will have his preferred jurisdiction; and the other party can
hardly claim that the jurisdiction was utterly inappropriate given
that he had already ventured into it on his own. The sensible pre-
caution therefore for any driver to take, as a stranger in a strange
land, is to purchase automobile insurance from a national firm-
or, when appropriate, take out liability insurance with the rental
car company in order to hire in advance an agent to represent the
driver before the dispute begins. On this analysis, even without
the trappings of implied consent to adjudication within the juris-
diction, Hess looks to represent sound law.
Matters quickly become increasingly difficult, however, in
situations where the defendant takes action in one jurisdiction,
and the plaintiff suffers injury in another. In principle, it might
just be possible to come up with a Kaldor-Hicks efficient solution,
by divining perhaps a rule that offers larger gains to the winner
than the costs it imposes on the loser."5 However, it is very diffi-
cult to envision on a transaction-by-transaction basis any rule
that, after the fact, is likely to bring about a Pareto improvement,
that is, one that improves the welfare of both sides simultane-
ously. The inability to arrange for side compensation between
strangers blocks the win-win outcomes achievable with ordinary
voluntary contracts.
85 Under the Kaldor-Hicks standard of optimality, a transaction is judged to be effi-
cient only if it produces a net gain, whether or not it improves the economic position of
each individual party to the transaction. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of the
Law 12-16 (Aspen 5th ed 1998).
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At this point, the language of hypothetical consent forces us
to consider the optimal rule, not with respect to a single interac-
tion, but as applied to classes of cases in which various individu-
als could assume with equal chances the role of either plaintiff or
defendant. Thus, if, on average, the gains to plaintiffs from their
preferred jurisdictional rule exceed the losses to defendant from
the application of that rule, then hypothetically both parties
would consent to the arrangement if they had a chance to con-
tract early on, before either knew what would befall him. If some-
one ventures far enough behind the veil of ignorance, it becomes
almost impossible to distinguish between Kaldor-Hicks and
Pareto efficiency. Similarly, it is hard to be confident as to which
rule advances social welfare by either measure. In one sense, this
theoretical impasse is quite disturbing because it exposes the lim-
its of legal and economic theory in solving concrete problems. But,
in another sense, it is quite comforting: the weakness of any
methodology when we get beyond the cases of express and im-
plied consent should increase our confidence in the techniques in
the consensual cases to which it more naturally applies.
What is quite amazing about this impoverished analysis in
hypothetical consent cases is how quickly the problem comes to a
head even in the simplest of cases. Suppose X in state A shoots a
bullet that hits Y in state B. Must Y come to state A in order to
sue X, or can Y sue X in Y's own forum, B, where the effects are
most manifest? My own view is that we are most likely to mini-
mize the resort to force by holding that aggressors on jurisdic-
tional issues have to take a back seat to their victims. So with
some trepidation, Y should be able to sue in state B where he has
suffered the injury, in which case X receives protection by notice.
Yet that solution is far from perfect, because it presupposes that
X has shot Y. The apparent equities would have cut in exactly the
other direction if the evidence revealed that Z, not X, had shot the
gun. But here, on balance, we have to assume that the former is
the greater probability than the latter, so that it becomes the fo-
cal point for the legal rules. Yet even if Y has the advantage of
the home forum in B, he may be well advised to chase X down in
his home state if only to obtain increased leverage over X on such
routine matters as holding depositions and placing interrogato-
ries.
The basic problem, however, only gets worse when cognizable
harm is not limited to physical connection but covers injury to
reputation, losses from anticompetitive behavior, or fraud over
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the internet. The location of the tort of defamation is virtually
impossible to determine for media defendants that broadcast or
publish in many places at once. Moreover, there is much to be
said for the single publication rule that allows all these publica-
tions to be treated as one for legal purposes, for it is hard to see
any social gains that come from fragmenting a single cause of
action.86 It hardly follows, however, that the choice of forum
should influence the substantive law to the point where the
plaintiff gets the advantage of a state's longish statute of limita-
tions when only a tiny fraction of its total sales took place in that
state.8 7 It seems easy enough here to respect the statute of limita-
tions in other jurisdictions by using as a rough proxy the propor-
tion of sales in each state to determine the percentage of damages
recoverable for the defamation. The usual rule for class action is
that the amalgamation of separate claims should do as little as
possible to alter the outcome of each individual claim that is
made part of the overall mix.88 The choice of law rules should not,
for example, be used to allow the plaintiff to claim the benefit of
substantive law of that jurisdiction most favorable to him.89 Here
the general prohibition against strategic behavior seems strong
enough to place some sensible limits on the jurisdictional choices
generally available to the plaintiff in a manner consistent with
the hypothetical consent program outlined above.
A similar problem arises in connection with antitrust injury
that occurs when, for example, an antitrust conspiracy takes
place in Portugal which has the object of raising prices in the
United States. Wholly apart from the impressive choice of law
86 See Keeton v Hustler Magazine, Inc, 465 US 770, 777 (1984) (noting that the bene-
fits of the single publication include "reduc[ing] the potential serious drain of libel cases on
judicial resources" and protect[ing] defendants from harassment resulting from multiple
suits").
87 For example, in Keeton, a New York plaintiff brought a libel suit against an Ohio-
based magazine publisher in Federal District Court in New Hampshire. Id at 770. The
plaintiff filed in New Hampshire because under traditional choice of law provisions, the
law of the forum state governs on procedural matters. Id at 778. In New Hampshire,
which had a six-year statute of limitations for libel actions, statutes of limitations were
considered procedural. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction, noting that any potential unfairness caused by the New
Hampshire statute of limitations had nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the New
Hampshire court to adjudicate the matter. Id at 778.
88 See Reilly v Gould, 965 F Supp 588, 596 (M D Pa 1997) ("If facts are not common to
the entire class and there is a need to address each party's claims individually, then a
class action would not be an efficient device in doing so.").
89 See Nelson v International Paint Co, 716 F2d 640, 643 (9th Cir 1983) (warning of
the need to guard against forum shopping by preventing plaintiffs from taking advantage
of choice-of-law rules to which they would not have been entitled in proper fora).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
problems that arise, it becomes delicate to assert that an Ameri-
can court should take jurisdiction over actions that take place
abroad, especially if the defendant only conducts his business in
the United States through third party intermediaries. Overall,
though, I am satisfied that the victims should be allowed to pur-
sue the action in their home forum where the damage takes
place. One way in which to secure this outcome in a wide number
of cases is to require each distributor of goods and services in the
United States (or anywhere else) to agree to respond for any civil
wrongs committed by his suppliers overseas. That low-level fix
should have the desired effect of making clear the jurisdictional
reach of the power in question and avoiding many of the problems
associated with using hypothetical consent to ground jurisdic-
tional decisions in stranger cases.
V. AN INTERNET CODA
Here we should turn to the questions of the internet. In prin-
ciple, these do not raise any issues different from those associated
with the use of telephone conversations that start in one jurisdic-
tion and end in another. But, in practice, the sheer velocity of the
transactions in question both exposes and magnifies the weak-
nesses of any rule that we might choose. The difficulties in ques-
tion are well illustrated by a problem that is discussed in some
detail in Professor Bellia's article which addresses the many is-
sues that arise now that Yahoo! is caught between American and
French law.D° Operating out of its American site, Yahoo! offers for
sale Nazi memorabilia.91 Their purchase and sale may well be
protected under the First Amendment within the United States,92
and is, in any event, not illegal in California where Yahoo! main-
tains its site. However, the sale of Nazi memorabilia is illegal in
France, where a large number of French subscribers have access
to the Yahoo! site.9" The question is the extent to which Yahoo!
should be subject to French law on the ground that it does busi-
ness in France.
To the French authorities, the problem seems simple enough.
Yahoo! has to comply with French law or face heavy fines.94 It can
90 See Patricia L. Bellia, Chasing Bits across Borders, 2001 U Chi Legal F 35, 65-66.
91 See John Tagliabue, French Uphold Ruling against Yahoo on Nazi Sites, NY Times
C8 (Nov 21, 2000).
92 US Const Amend I.
93 Tagliabue, French Uphold Ruling Against Yahoo on Nazi Sites, NY Times at C8
(cited in note 91).
94 Id.
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do so by making it impossible to access Nazi memorabilia from
French sites, which requires Yahoo! to develop and implement
technology that allows its listings to be downloaded in some but
not all jurisdictions.95 That technology is, as best I can tell, avail-
able today, but difficult and very expensive to implement, since
the transmission and retransmission of information is hard for
any party to control. So how should the French interest be recon-
ciled with the American? On this question, the analytical distinc-
tion seems clear. The greater the power that Yahoo! has to cut off
its French users from foreign communications, the stronger
France's case is for applying its rule. The ability to tailor a re-
sponse removes the risk of overbroad application of the law. Most
governments routinely assert jurisdiction over transactions that
start outside their countries but have effects within it, and this
case is no exception.96
Where partition is not possible, then the choices are much
more difficult to make. Now the great danger of the French rule is
that it allows France to set policy for the rest of the world by ex-
posing internet service providers worldwide to the risk of sanc-
tions in French courts. To be sure, some firms may not have as-
sets capable of seizure in France, but many will, in fact, be so ex-
posed. The assertion therefore of French, or indeed any other ju-
risdiction, could lead to a race to the bottom, which is not the re-
sult of pure competitive forces. The converse risk, however, is far
smaller, for it does not follow that France's local law will be evis-
cerated if Yahoo! can continue to post its listings in the United
States as before. Nothing prevents France from prosecuting its
own citizens for their purchase and sale of Nazi memorabilia.
But, it may be objected, that France may find it difficult to
track down its own citizens who engage in these internet transac-
tions. It is hard to believe that this difficulty is any greater for
France than it is for transactions in real space. In addition, it
may well be possible for Yahoo! to give to the French government
any list it assembles of French nationals who purchase Nazi
memorabilia from its site. At this point, the French can attack
these transactions at the buying end instead of chasing Yahoo!
across borders.
On this last point, it could be objected that Yahoo! should be
allowed under American law to protect the privacy of its French
customers. But here I think that, so long as we wish to secure the
95 Id.
96 Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U Chi L Rev 1199, 1239 (1998).
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dispensation of American site operators from French law, we
should be prepared to cooperate with French authorities, so long
as they agree to use the information supplied only for the limited
purpose for which is intended. Whatever the domestic reach of
the First Amendment, its scope seems to be restricted in foreign
affairs. As a matter of general theory, we can impose a solution
that forces each side to relax on matters that are regarded as of
vital interest to the other, which is what parties do when they
enter into explicit contracts. But we should not hold out undue
hope for this solution, even if it is accepted as a default position.
In line with the general theory, we should hope that both nations
will be able to work out some protocol that turns hypothetical
contracts into real treaties to reduce the pressure on the hypo-
thetical doctrines that we have.
Once again, the difficulties that we have in the cases of hypo-
thetical consent should be interpreted, not as a failure of the
overall consensual approach, but as a concession to the difficul-
ties that stranger transactions pose to any and all theories. The
important message to take away is that, as transaction costs be-
come lower, the scope of first implied, and then express, consent
cases grows with time. It is one thing to bewail the failure of a
theory to make a dent into a huge class of cases, but here we have
to look at the overall picture. Rival theories, as far as I can tell,
do not do well in stranger cases either. And they then tend to
denigrate the role of consent in those cases where it does work.
They wrongly treat all determinations of implied consent as
though they were fictional, when many are not. They interpose
all sorts of consumer-protection obstacles in the path of express
consent cases. But a renewed concern with consent as the deter-
minant of jurisdiction helps to meet these objections. So long as
the parties to a contract can convert cases of implied consent into
cases of explicit consent, the percentage of jurisdictional cases
that rest on a firm footing should increase, not decrease, over
time. The difficulties with stranger cases remain; the ambiguities
of implied consent cases remain nettlesome, here as in other con-
tractual areas. But the overall direction of the law moves in the
right direction as explicit contracts gobble up more and more of
the disputed territory. The challenge that I leave to the confer-
ence is to come up with a theory that beats this theory, with all
its imperfections.
